Twenty-Five Years Of The Substantial Advancement Doctrine Applied
to Regulatory Takings: From Agins To Lingle v. Chevron
by Larry Salzman1

ABSTRACT
Beginning with Agins v. City of Tiburon, and continuing for 25 years, the United States
Supreme Court has held that regulation effects a taking when it does not substantially
advance legitimate state interests. Throughout this period, many have criticized this
standard as “a return to Lochner,” opposed to the extreme deference accorded economic
and property regulation since the New Deal.
A careful review of cases reveals, however, that the “substantial advancement” doctrine is
not simply a means-ends review of the efficacy of economic legislation. Rather, the
doctrine was initially conceived, and has been applied, as a cause-effect test to ensure that
restrictive land-use regulations are designed to mitigate social costs that would be caused
by the unregulated use of the property in question. Although no return to Lochner, in
some cases (most recently in Lingle v. Chevron) the doctrine confronts the need to set
limits to the proper exercise of the police power – a function that has been abdicated by
the judiciary since Nebbia v. New York. This deeper conflict explains the vehemence of
Agins’ critics and, the article concludes, must be resolved if takings law is to shed its
post-New Deal ambiguity and function effectively in the unending struggle of
constitutional principle against legislative will.
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INTRODUCTION
In Agins v. City of Tiburon2 the United States Supreme Court stated that a zoning
regulation “effects a taking if the ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate
state interests.”3 The essence of a taking, wrote Justice Powell, was the “determination
that the public at large, rather than a single owner, must bear the burden of an exercise of
state power in the public interest.”4 Since that time, the Court has cited or discussed this
standard5 in nine cases during the past 25 years.6
Nonetheless, many commentators have argued that Agins should not be taken too
seriously: that its substantial advancement language is a return to abandoned standards of
judicial review typified by Lochner v. New York7 or a sloppy injection of economic due

2

447 U.S. 255 (1980)

3

Id. at 260.

4

Id.

5

The Court’s inquiry as to whether or not a regulation “does not substantially
advance legitimate state interests” is variously referred to throughout this paper as the
substantial advancement doctrine or the first prong of the Agins test.
6

See Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535
U.S. 302, 334 (2002); City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, 526 U.S. 687,
704 (2002); Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 19 (1988)(Scalia, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994); Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 (1992); Yee v. City of Escondido,
503 U.S. 519, 534 (1992); Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictus, 480 U.S.
470, 485 (1987); Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); United
States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 126 (1985).
7

198 U.S. 45 (1905). See, e.g., Ronald H. Rosenberg and Nancy Stroud, When
Lochner Met Dolan: The Attempted Transformation Of American Land-Use Law By
Constitutional Interpretation, 33 Urb. Law 663, 669-70 (2001).
3

process doctrine into takings law; an ill-considered means/ends test out of step with the
logic of the takings clause.8 This is argued despite the fact that the Court continues to
discuss it and has declined to disavow the doctrine.9 The recent grant of certiorari in
Lingle v. Chevron,10 however, provides the Court with a clear opportunity to clarify the
meaning and use of the Agins standard in regulatory takings cases.
In the Chevron case,11 the Ninth Circuit was called on to determine whether a rent
control regulation capping the rent at which oil companies could lease gas stations to
independent dealer-operators took the oil companies’ property for public use without
compensation. The stated purpose of the law was to reduce consumer gasoline prices.12
The court applied the Agins test as a straightforward means-ends review of economic
regulation, finding that it effected a regulatory taking. The key to the judgment was a
8

John D. Echeverria, Does a Regulation That Fails to Advance a Legitimate
Governmental Interest Result in a Regulatory Taking?, 29 Envtl. L. 853, 858 (1999);
Brief For Petitioners, Lingle v. Chevron, No. 04-163, 2004 WL 2811060 (December 3,
2004), at 23-28.
9

See R.S. Radford, Of Course a Land Use Regulation That Fails to Substantially
Advance Legitimate State Interests Results in a Regulatory Taking, 15 Fordham L. Rev.
353, 369-72 (2004) (discussing the court’s refusal to disclaim the standard in Del Monte
Dunes despite the urging of the Solicitor General of the United States to do so).
10

Lingle v. Chevron, 125 S. Ct. 314 (Mem.) (Oct. 12. 2004) (granting cert.).

11

The case was lodged in the U.S. District Court for the District of Hawaii as
Chevron v. Cayetano, 57 F. Supp. 2d 1003 (1998). Durings its appeals in the Ninth
Circuit it was styled as Chevron v. Lingle, reflecting the change in Hawaii’s governorship.
12

See Haw. Rev. Stat. § 257(4)(1997) (stating “In a highly concentrated market,
market prices tend to rise above competitive levels. Market prices persistently above
competitive levels are harmful to consumers and the public”); Chevron v. Cayetano, 57 F.
Supp. 2d at 1010 (finding “that while the legislature was mindful of the need to protect
lessee dealers, this consideration was essentially a step toward the ultimate goal of
(continued…)
4

determination that the design of the statute rendered it incapable of substantially
advancing the goal of lower consumer gasoline prices. I review the context of Chevron
in Part I of this article and argue that the Ninth Circuit has misapplied the Agins test.13
Whatever the ultimate outcome of Chevron before the Supreme Court, however,
this case is a good place to begin a wider investigation into the meaning of the substantial
advancement test in takings law. The Ninth Circuit and many commentators believe that
the test weighs (rightly or wrongly) the efficacy of regulation;14 that it applies heightened
judicial scrutiny to regulations in order to determine whether they will succeed in
achieving the stated purpose for which they were enacted. In addition to supporting the
idea that Agins is an accidental lumping together of takings and due process concerns, this
view leads to odd results.

Why, for instance, would a regulation that substantially

advances a public purpose, while disproportionately burdening an individual property
owner, not be a taking?15 If the effect of the regulation causes an individual to bear alone

reducing gasoline prices for Hawaii’s consumers.”).
13

See infra, text at notes 59-67

14

See Molly S. McUsic, The Ghost of Lochner: Modern Takings Doctrine And Its
Impact On Economic Legislation, 76 B.U.L. Rev. 605, 636 (1996); Frank Michelman,
Takings, 1987, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1600, 1604-05 (1988)
15

A plausible response might be that such a regulation could be struck down under
Agins’ second prong, for depriving the owner of economically viable use of the property.
See Agins, 447 U.S. at 260. This element of the Agins test derives from Penn Central
Transportation Corp. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), where it referred to
depriving commercial rental property of a competitive rate of return. Id. at 138, n.36.
Since the Court’s decision in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 512 U.S. 374
(1994), however, Agins’ second prong has almost invariably been misstated as requiring
deprivation of all economically viable use – which the Court recently redefined as loss of
all value. See Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency,
(continued…)
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costs that should be borne by the public, it would appear to be just the sort of
circumstance the takings clause was meant to remedy.16 Further, the Supreme Court has
not shown any general inclination to reverse its long standing policy of extreme deference
to legislatures enacting economic regulation.17
In part II of this Article, I argue that the Supreme Court does not conceive the
Agins test to measure the efficacy of a regulation in achieving alleged state interests or as
second-guessing legislative judgments in that regard.18 Rather, members of the Court
who have spoken to the issue have a narrower concern: whether a regulation justly
mitigates an alleged “social cost”19 caused by the unregulated use of property. Where the

535 U.S. at 332. Consequently, the second prong of Agins no longer retains any content
as an independent, substantive takings test.
16

Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987) is, in my
opinion, a case in which such a result was in fact reached. In dissent, Chief Justice
Rehnquist noted that previous cases “have never found it sufficient that legislation
efficiently achieves its desired objectives to hold that the compensation required by the
Fifth Amendment is unavailable.” Keystone, 480 U.S. at 512 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting). For a further discussion of the “paradox of efficient regulation” see William
A. Fischel, Exploring the Kozinski Paradox: Why is More Efficient Regulation a Taking
of Property?, 67 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 865 (1991).
17

Cf. Concrete Pipe & Prods. Of Ca., Inc. v. Constr’n Laborers Pension Trust, 508
U.S. 602, 637 (1993) (noting the continuing policy that regulations “adjusting the burdens
and benefits of economic life come to the Court with a presumption of constitutionality.”)
18
19

See infra, text at notes 146-169.

“Social costs” are typically understood as actions by firms or individuals that have
harmful effects on others. See generally R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.
Law & Econ 1-44 (1960). The term “social cost” is used reluctantly, but made necessary
by the imprecision at the heart of the substantial advancement doctrine. Society is merely
a large collection of individuals; there is no “entity apart from and superior to the sum of
its individual members.” See Ayn Rand, Collectivized Rights, in the VIRTUE OF
SELFISHNESS 118, 120 (1964). Where nuisances or other potentially improper uses of
(continued…)
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burden imposed on a property owner is divorced from or disproportionate to the social
costs his property causes, a taking is likely to be found. I suggest that the substantial
advancement test functions to channel the regulation of property between the poles of
judicial review established by Nebbia v. New York20 and Lochner v. New York.21 Nebbiastyle deference to property regulation would undermine the operative principle of the
takings clause, which is to “bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear
public burdens.”22 Strict adherence to that principle, however, would breach modern
sensibilities about judicial restraint, represented by widespread hostility to the Court’s
judgment in Lochner.23 The Court therefore applies the substantial advancement standard
not as a mean/ends inquiry but as a cause-effect test, in an effort to unmoor takings
jurisprudence from any particular theory of rights or economics. It does so to escape the

property impose unjust burdens on others, those costs are borne not by “society,” but by
particular persons. The term “social costs” serves to blur the rights involved when
conflicts arise and confer standing on parties who ought have no interest in the
controversy. Furthermore, one consequence of the term’s widespread use is to maintain
an ambiguous definition of “harm” in the property rights context, which is a basic cause
of its muddled jurisprudence.
20

291 U.S. 505 (1934).

21

198 U.S. 45.

22

Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 48 (1960).

23

See David E. Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism, Revised: Lochner and the
Origins of Fundamental Rights Constitutionalism, 92 Geo. L. J. 1, 1-5 and n. 12 (2003)
(describing the typical view of Lochner and noting that the case “was so reviled that as far
as this Author can determine, between the demise of Lochner in West Coast Hotel v.
Parrish in 1937 and publication of Bernard Siegan’s Economic Liberties and the
Constitution in 1980, hundreds of passages appeared, but only a single article that
expressed even mild support for Lochner was published”).
7

criticisms of Lochner while upholding what it regards as the essence of the takings clause.
This approach is employed to cope with precedent and other institutional constraints.24
I argue in Part III, however, that this attempt to find a doctrinal middle ground is
fundamentally flawed.25 The substantial advancement test purports to protect the rights
of property owners by raising the level of judicial scrutiny applied to property regulations.
Since the Court often fails to precisely identify the object of scrutiny, however, the test
invites misapplication as a displaced due process standard. On the surface, a cause-effect
test deflects critics who decry the intrusion of allegedly due process concerns into takings
law. A shift from a means-ends to cause-effect analysis of property regulations, however,
does not eliminate the need for judges to determine the Constitutional legitimacy of
regulatory ends. I argue that the substantial advancement test protects property rights
only insofar as it incorporates individualist values concerning the legitimate ends of
property regulation. My conclusion is that Agins does not mistakenly apply due process
standards to takings law, but does mask old and necessary questions concerning the
rightful scope of legislative authority—questions once considered in due process cases,
but that have been evaded since Lochner’s repudiation.

24

See infra, Part II; see generally Molly S. McUsic, Looking Inside Out:
Institutional Analysis and the Problem of Takings, 92 Nw. U. L. Rev. 591 (1998).
25

See infra, text at notes 176-198.
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I. AGINS, THE SUBSTANTIAL ADVANCEMENT
DOCTRINE, AND LINGLE v. CHEVRON
The roles of due process and takings analysis are often distinguished on the basis
that, unlike a concern for due process, the takings clause “is designed not to limit the
governmental interference with property rights per se but rather to secure compensation
in the event of otherwise proper interference amounting to a taking.”26 Were the Court to
invalidate a general economic regulation on the premise that it insufficiently advances a
legislative goal, it would be in “uneasy tension with [the Court’s] understanding of the
Takings Clause,”27 because it would “open the door to normative considerations about the
wisdom of government decisions.”28

The classic form of judging the wisdom of

government decisions is a determination that the objective of the regulation is
insufficiently related to the means employed to achieve it.29 This is why commentators
view “the rationale for applying a means-ends test in challenges under the Takings Clause

26

First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S.
304, 314 (1987); Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 554 (1998) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (noting that unlike the due process clause, the takings clause did not concern
the “prevent[ion] of arbitrary or unfair government action, but with providing
compensation for legitimate government action that takes ‘private property’ to serve the
‘public’ good.”). Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (implying
that a regulation warranting compensation under the takings clause is valid under the due
process clause since it “presupposes that it is wanted for public use”).
27

Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. at 545 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment and dissenting in part).
28

Id.

29

Lochner, 198 U.S. at 56 (holding that a regulation “must have a more direct
relation, as a means to an end . . . to be valid”).
9

[as] suspect.”30 The analysis of rent control statutes in three recent Ninth Circuit cases
exhibits elements of this tension between Due Process and Takings doctrine.
A. Agins Applied To Rent Control
Richardson v. City and County of Honolulu ,31 Chevron v. Lingle,32 and Cashman
v. City of Cotati33 each involve challenges to regulations aimed at lowering rents of
varying types, and the Ninth Circuit has found a taking in each case because the
regulations failed to substantially advance legitimate governmental interests. In each of
these cases the Court of Appeals invoked Agins in applying heightened scrutiny to the
rent control measure in question. The key to finding a taking in each case was that the
benefits of reduced rents could be capitalized by the initial tenants and sold to their
successors in interest. The general rule enunciated by the Ninth Circuit is that rent
regulations of this type are unconstitutional on their face under Agins, absent some
mechanism or market feature that could prevent tenants from simply cashing out the
expected monetary value of rent control by collecting a “premium” on the sale of their
tenancies to third parties.34

30

John D. Echeverriea, Does a Regulation That Fails To Advance A Legitimate
Governmental Interest Result In A Regulatory Takings?, at 857-59; see also Jerold S.
Kayden, Land Use Regulation, Rationality and Judicial Review: The RSVP in the Nollan
Invitation (Part I), 23 Urb. Law. 301, 316-320 (1991).
31

124 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 1997).

32

363 F.3d 846 (9th Cir. 2004).

33

374 F.3d 887 (9th Cir. 2004).

34

See Cashman, 374 F.3d at 897.
10

The Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in these cases descends from the Supreme Court’s
observation in another rent control case, Yee v. City of Escondido.35 There Justice
O’Connor wrote that the financial capitalization of the value of rent control by tenants
“might have some bearing on whether the ordinance causes a regulatory taking, as it may
shed some light on whether there is a sufficient nexus between the effect of the ordinance
and the objectives it is supposed to advance.”36 Yee was brought to the Court on the
theory that an Escondido, California, rent control ordinance (in conjunction with
statewide eviction controls) was tantamount to a permanent physical occupation of the
park owners’ property interest. A regulatory takings inquiry, therefore, did not arise.37
Justice O’Connor’s dicta, however, was taken as an invitation to bring a regulatory
takings challenge to this type of rent control under Agins.
1. Richardson
Richardson, the first Yee follow-up case to be heard by the Ninth Circuit on
its merits,38 challenged two ordinances affecting rental property in Honolulu.39

35

503 U.S. 519 (1992).

36

Id. at 530.

The

37

Id. at 533 (the question of whether a regulatory taking occurred was not “properly
before [the Court].”).
38

A number of cases germane to Yee were appealed to the Ninth Circuit, but were
settled on procedural grounds. See e.g., Carson Harbor Village, Ltd. v. City of Carson,
37 F.3d 468 (9th Cir. 1994); Levald, Inc. v City of Palm Desert, 998 F.2d 680 (9th Cir.
1993); Mission Oaks Mobile Home Park v. City of Hollister, 989 F.2d 359 (9th Cir.
1993); Palomar Mobilehome Park Assoc. v. City of San Marcos, 989 F.2d 362 (9th Cir.
1993); Azul-Pacifico, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 973 F.2d 704 (9th Cir. 1992).
39

See Richardson, 124 F.3d at 1153 (describing Honolulu City & County, Haw.
(continued…)
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stated purpose of these measures was to remedy certain alleged failures of Hawaii’s
real estate market, including a concentration of land ownership and property
prices deemed excessive.40 One effect of the high concentration of land ownership is that
a significant percentage of Honolulu’s condominiums are owned in fee simple, but the
land on which the condominium buildings are constructed is held under a long-term
lease.41
Ordinance 91-95 authorized the use of the state’s condemnation power to convert
the lessees’ leasehold estates into fee simple interests.42 The second measure, Ordinance
91-96, capped increases in ground rents according to a formula calculated to hold these
rents below market levels.43

The ordinance further specified that the below-market

ground leases must be transferred without modification to the new owner-occupants
whenever a condominium was sold.44 The Ninth Circuit upheld Ordinance 91-95 was
upheld by the Ninth Circuit under the Supreme Court’s precedent in Hawaii Housing
Authority v. Midkiff.45

Midkiff approved a similar lease-to-fee transfer law in

Ordinance 91-95 and 91-96 (1991)).
40

See id. at 1154.

41

See id. at 1159 (citing legislative finding that in 1987, 50.4% of all Honolulu
condominium units were situated on leased land owned by 60 persons).
42

Ord. 91-95 § 5.2.

43

Id. § 1.5(b).

44

Id. § 1.10.

45

See Richardson, 124 F.3d at 1157 (citing Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff,
467 U.S. 229 (1984)).
12

1984 against a takings clause challenge.46

Ordinance 91-96, however, was held to

be a taking without compensation and the law was set aside.47
The key to the Ninth Circuit’s ruling lies in the unique circumstances of what
Professor Hirsch refers to as “immobile housing assets under divided ownership.”48 In
Hawaii’s condominium market, as with the California mobile home parks at issue in Yee,
one party commonly owns a residential structure situated on land that is leased or rented
from someone else. The cost of housing in such markets is the sum of two variables: the
price of the structure (the condominium or mobile home coach), plus the discounted value
of the stream of ground rent payments over the life of the structure.49 Other things equal,
changes in the actual or expected amount of the ground lease will have an inverse impact
on the price of the structure.50
In this market environment, the imposition of rent control creates opportunities for
windfalls that can be captured by tenants in occupancy at the time the regulations are
adopted.51 From the viewpoint of prospective buyers of condominiums or mobile home

46

Id. at 245. Unlike the more current Ninth Circuit cases, Midkiff was not an action
for compensation but sought to enjoin implementation of the transfer law on the basis that
it was not a Taking for public use.
47

Richardson, 124 F.3d at 1166 (“We accordingly hold that Ordinance 91-96
violates the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.”).
48

See Werner Z.Hirsch & Anthony M. Rufolo, The Regulation of Immobile Housing
Assets under Divided Ownership, 19 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 383 (1999).
49

See id. at 384-87.

50

See id.

51

This opportunity for tenants to directly convert the benefits of the regulations to
(continued…)
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coaches, the prospect of reduced ground rents increases the price they are willing to pay
for the structure. Incoming tenants pay at the margin the discounted present value of
reduced rents in the form of a “premium,” or increment to the price paid for the
condominium or coach. Outgoing tenants would pocket the full economic value of the
regulations, incoming tenants would enjoy no reduction in the net cost of housing, and
land owners would be saddled with below-market returns on their investment solely to
facilitate a one-time wealth transfer between third parties. This is the regulatory scenario
that both the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii52 and the Ninth
Circuit determined did not comprise a substantial advancement of legitimate state
interests in Richardson.53
2. Cashman
A closely analogous regulatory scheme played out to the same result in
Cashman.54 California mobile home park owners are prevented by state law from having
any voice in the in-site sale of their tenants’ coaches,55 and local rent control ordinances
like the City of Cotati’s prohibit them from raising space rents upon the sale of a coach in

cash is what distinguishes rent control under divided asset ownership from garden-variety
apartment rent control. See Fischel, supra note 15, at 873-76.
52

See Richardson v. City and County of Honolulu, 802 F.Supp. 326 (D. Hawaii,

1992).
53

See 124 F.3d 1166.

54

See Cashman, 374 F.3d at 899.

55

Cal Civ. Code §§ 789-99.7.
14

their park to a new tenant.56 Exactly as in the case of Honolulu’s condominiums, the
tenants who occupied Cotati’s mobile home parks at the time rent control was imposed
were able to capture a regulatory windfall by selling their coaches at a premium, keeping
the affordability of Cotati’s housing the same but forcing park owners to bear the burden
of facilitating a private wealth transfer.57 In Cashman the California city of Cotati’s
mobile home rent control program was held to be a taking.58 Although the ordinance
stated seven goals, summarized by the District Court as the city’s “interest in maintaining
affordable rent, lessening inequality of bargaining power and permitting landlords a
reasonable rate of return,”59 the Ninth Circuit focused on the program’s operative
effect of enabling tenants to capitalize the value of the regulations into premiums in
the resale price of their coaches.60

Because it perceived Cotati’s rent ordinance as

merely facilitating a private wealth transfer, the Court of Appeals followed its holding in

56

See Mobilehome Park Space Rent Stabilization Program, City of Cotati Ordinance
No. 680 (1998), at § 19.14.150 (2)(c).
57

See e.g., R.S. Radford, Why Rent Control is Still a Regulatory Taking, Program
for Judicial Awareness Working Paper No. 05-0001 9-16 (Jan. 12, 2005) (citing Werner
Z. Hirsch & Joel C. Hirsch, Legal-Economic Analysis of Rent Controls in a Mobile Home
Context: Placement Values and Vacancy Decontrol, 35 UCLA L. Rev. 399, 423-24
(1988)).
58

Cashman v. City of Cotati, 374 F.3d 887, 899 (2004) (“The district court holds
that summary judgment is appropriate because this possibility of a premium prevented
Hawaii's rent control ordinance from substantially advancing its purpose. We affirm.”)
(internal citation omitted).
59

Cashman, 374 F. 3d at 896.

60

See id. at 897.
15

Richardson and struck down the regulations for failing to substantially advance legitimate
state interests.61
3. Chevron
Chevron, which was decided between Richardson and Cashman, is in many ways
the most problematic of the three cases. Like Richardson, Chevron springs from a
Hawaii rent control ordinance, albeit commercial rather than residential.

Many of

Hawaii’s gasoline stations are owned by major oil companies and leased to independent
dealers who operate them. In an effort to lower gasoline prices, the Hawaii legislature
enacted Act 257 to cap the rents which oil companies can charge lessee-dealers.62
Alternative objectives of the Act have been argued at various times during litigation, but
the Hawaii legislature apparently attempted

to lower gasoline prices by either: 1)

lowering the rents to lessee-dealers, which would then be able to pass that savings along
to consumers, 2) bolstering the profits of lessee-dealers, thereby ensuring the long-term
survival of a robust network of independent gasoline dealers in the state, or 3) frustrating
alleged oil company intent to drive lessee-dealers out of the business with excessive
rents.63 The premise behind this latter goal is that having many independent dealers
enhances competition among gas stations, including corporate-owned stations, which
leads to lower prices.

61

See Cashman, 374 F. 3d at 889 (citing to Richardson).

62

Haw. Rev. Stat. § 486H-10.4 (1997).

63

Chevron v. Cayetano, 198 F. Supp. 2d. 1182, 1191 (2002) (describing the goals of
Act 257).
16

The Ninth Circuit saw the state’s regulation of gas station rents as analogous to
Richardson, reasoning that Act 257 would enable independent dealers to capture the
value of the controls by selling their dealerships to new owners.64 As the District Court
explained, rather than lower gasoline prices, the rent cap would simply lower the dealer’s
cost of doing business, allowing the dealer’s profits to increase over what they would
have been without the regulation.65 Oil companies like Chevron would be forced to bear
the burden of this cost reduction and, since the economic benefits of the regulation could
be captured by the dealers upon the sale of their business, the rent cap “will generate a
premium [in the resale price of dealerships] that reflects the difference between the
incumbent dealer’s expected market rent and the lower rent.”66 Accordingly, the District
Court found that the Act was a taking under the first prong of Agins, and the Ninth Circuit
affirmed.67
On closer examination, though, the regulatory scheme at issue in Chevron differs
in significant ways from both Richardson and Cashman.

Most essentially, the

characteristic of divided asset ownership is entirely missing. The independent dealers are
merely commercial tenants like any others, paying rent on their place of business. And
for its part, Chevron does not own the land on which the stations are located – the oil

64

Chevron v. Cayetano, 224 F.3d 1030, 34 (9th Cir. 2000).

65

Chevron, 198 F. Supp. 2d. at 1187.

66

Id. at 1189-90.

67

Id. at 1992, aff’d, Chevron v. Lingle, 363 F.3d 846, 858 (9th Cir. 2004).
17

companies themselves pay ground rent to third parties.68 Thus, if the dealers in Chevron
do realize a “premium” on the sale of their dealerships, it is not because the asset value of
their real property has been enhanced by a corresponding reduction in the value of the
landowners’ estate, as is the case in Richardson and Cashman..
But the differences do not stop there. Unlike the situation in both Richardson and
Cashman, Chevron is not forced to stand aside while its tenants freely negotiate the sale
of their structures to third parties; the contracts between Chevron and its commercial
tenants “permit the dealer to transfer his or her occupancy rights upon obtaining
Chevron’s written consent and paying a transfer fee set by Chevron.”69 Finally, in both
Cashman and Richardson, the landowners’ only commercial dealings with their tenants
was via the ground lease that was the subject of the regulation. Once rent control was
adopted, it imposed a clearly defined and measurable burden on the landowners, and
delivered an identical financial benefit, readily capable of capitalization, to their tenants.
In Chevron, however, the oil company’s leases with its independent dealers are combined
with oil supply contracts requiring that the gasoline sold at the dealers’ service stations be
purchased from Chevron. Thus, wholly unlike Cashman and Richardson, the commercial
landlords in Chevron may be able to recover their reduced rent revenues in the form of
higher oil prices under the supply contracts. This would eliminate any possibility of
premiums in the resale price of dealerships, regardless of what those premiums might
actually represent. In such a case, Chevron would not suffer a financial harm due to the
68

Id. at 1185.

18

imposition of rent control, although of course this mitigation would also negate the
regulation’s intended objective of lowering gasoline prices. The Act would thereby be an
unjust imposition on Chevron and feckless intervention in the market by regulators, but
distinguished from the takings in Richardson and Cashman.
Despite the serious economic and legal distinctions between Chevron on the one
hand, and Richardson and Cashman on the other, the three decisions have been linked
together by critics of Agins, who claim that these rent control cases are an example of
judicial authority substituting its judgment for that of the legislature. To some extent,
particularly in Chevron, the Ninth Circuit has left itself open to this criticism by seeming
to reduce the substantial advancement analysis to a simple means/ends test. For the
reasons set out in Part III I think this criticism is misplaced, but it is first worth
considering why means/ends analysis of economic regulation is so widely regarded as
problematic.
B. Lochnerand Nebbia Frame the Judicial Review
of Economic and Property Regulation
The Supreme Court faces a tension in reviewing property regulations due to the
post-New Deal conception of “judicial restraint.” Any sensible meaning of the takings
clause requires the Court to be concerned with abridgements of property rights, but what
sort of abridgments and of what type of property are questions the Court does not answer
by reference to Constitutional text alone.
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Chevron v. Cayetano, 224 F.3d 1030, 1032 (9th Cir. 2000) (emphasis added).
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Judicial attempts to proscribe the limits of legislative authority with respect to
property regulations are typically tarred as akin to Lochner v. New York,70 which is raised
as self-evident proof of imprudence. As is well known, the Court’s mode of analysis in
Lochner was to determine “which of two powers or rights shall prevail–the power of the
state to legislate or the right of the individual to liberty of person and freedom of
contract.”71 The labor law regulating the hours of bakers involved in that case was
invalidated as beyond the police power because it did not bear “a more direct relation, as
a means to an end”72 to the workers’ health and safety. Hostility to this approach to
constitutional adjudication is fairly represented by the assertion that it allows “Supreme
Court justices [to let] their ‘subjective’ and ‘political’ passions draw them into a kind of
judicial review that is both anti-democratic and institutionally suicidal.”73
The Court subsequently abandoned not merely the factual premises supporting the
Lochner decision, but its entire mode of analysis. Instead of a close means/ends scrutiny
of economic regulation, the Court announced a new policy to steer it clear of charges of
subjectivity or political bias. In Nebbia v. New York,74 the Court held that “[a] state is
70

198 U.S. 45.
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Id. at 57.
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Id.
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Duncan Kennedy, Toward an Historical Understanding of Legal Consciousness:
The Case of Classical Legal Thought in America, 1850-1940, 3 Res. L. & Soc. 3, 10
(1980). See also, Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 861-62 (O’Conner, J.,
plurality opinion) (describing the court’s loss or “lack of prescience” by adopting
Lochner’s standards of review in cases involving economic regulation).
74

291 U.S. 502.
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free to adopt whatever economic policy may be reasonably deemed to promote public
welfare, and to enforce that policy by legislation adapted to its purpose. The courts are
without authority either to declare such policy, or, when it is declared by the legislature,
to override it.”75
If it is understood as a means/ends test, Agins has an obvious relation to the mode
of analysis forgone by Nebbia. Members of the Court demonstrate their wariness of the
connection by frequently defending or criticizing takings decisions by reference to
Lochner. In Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel,76 for example, Justice Kennedy implores other
Members to invalidate a pension regulation on the basis of the Due Process Clause rather
than the Takings Clause. He assures them that “[i]nsofar as the plurality avoids reliance
upon the Due Process Clause for fear of resurrecting Lochner[], and related doctrines of
‘substantive due process,’ that fear is misplaced.”77 In Dolan v. City of Tigard,78 Justice
Stevens warned that “[t]he so-called ‘regulatory takings’ doctrine . . . has an obvious
kinship with . . . Lochner. Besides having similar ancestry, both doctrines are potentially
open-ended sources of judicial power to invalidate state economic regulations that
Members of this Court view as unwise or unfair.”79 Once again, in Lucas v. South
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Id. at 516.
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524 U.S. 498 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).
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Id. at 556 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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512 U.S. 374.
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Id. at 407 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Carolina Coastal Council,80 Justice Stevens fears a return to Lochner and laments that he
“had thought that we had long abandoned this approach to constitutional law.”81 Earlier,
in Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins,82 Justice Marshall warned against “a return to
the era of Lochner”83 in takings law–a sentiment echoed by Justice Blackman in Loretto
v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.84
Nebbia is the archetype of contemporary judicial policy: courts defer to legislative
judgment concerning the constitutionality of regulatory restraints on economic liberty and
property rights. This policy is in direct conflict with the previous view that a basic
function of the court is to maintain the “limit to the valid exercise of the police power by
the state.”85 The Court had always acknowledged the existence of a “police power” under
which “the government is free to adopt such laws as are necessary and when these are not
in conflict with any constitutional prohibitions, or fundamental principles, they cannot be
successfully assailed in a judicial tribunal.”86

It warned, however, that “under the

pretense of prescribing a police regulation the State cannot be permitted to encroach upon
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505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
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Id. at 1069 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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447 U.S. 74 (1980).

83

Id. at 93 (Marshall, J., concurring).
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458 U.S. 419, 455 (1982) (Blackman, J., dissenting).
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Lochner, 198 U.S. at 56.
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Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 86 (1872) (Field, J., dissenting).
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any of the just rights of the citizen, which the Constitution intended to secure against
abridgment.”87
Although reviewing the constitutional propriety of legislation is a core element of
the separation of powers, the post-Nebbia view is that deference to economic regulation is
required since “[a]ny departure from . . . judicial restraint would result in courts deciding
on what is and is not a government function; a practice which has proved impracticable in
other fields.”88 Yet, the imperative of the takings clause is compensation for government
takings of property. It is nearly redundant to point out that the judiciary’s obligation to
safeguard the liberties protected by the takings clause could not countenance “any
economic policy [that] may be reasonably deemed to promote the public welfare,”89
where that policy is implemented by regulations that take a property interest from
individuals for the alleged welfare of the public.90
In order to avoid the charge of “Lochnerism,” the modern Court has adopted an
expansive conception of the police power such that it will rarely, if ever, distinguish
between things legislatures may do and things they may not do in the area of economic
legislation.

87

Id.
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United States v. ex rel TVA v. Welch, 327 U.S. 546, 552 (1946).

89

Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 516.
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For a discussion of the history and background rights protected by the takings
clause, see generally, Bernard Siegan, PROPERTY RIGHTS: FROM MAGNA CARTA TO THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 108-116 (2001).
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Although the term “Lochnerism” is used here to indicate the charges made by
many commentators,91 it must be noted that term itself evades any consistent definition.
It is a classic instance of the fallacy of “package-dealing,” which is understood to be “the
fallacy of failing to discriminate crucial differences. It consists of treating together, as
parts of a single conceptual whole or ‘package,’ elements which different essentially in
nature, truth-status, importance or value.”92 In this instance, “Lochnerism” wrongly treats
as the same the valid principle of judicial review, arising from legal duties implied by the
Constitution’s separation of powers, with judicial subjectivism, which is an instance of
setting aside Constitutional values in favor of personal ones. The apparent purpose
of the term is to blur the distinction, leaving it unclear whether the criticism applies to
the latter or the former.

It thus serves the same function as, e.g., the term

“McCarthyism,” which fails to discriminate between a valid inquiry into the existence of
communist agents in positions of the government and the unjust smearing of innocent
individuals as communist, contrary to or in the absence of evidence. The function of the
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A Westlaw search by the author found the term employed in 204 law review and
journal articles recent enough to be included in the database.
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Leonard Peikoff, editor’s footnote to Ayn Rand, The Metaphysical Versus the
Man-Made, in PHILOSOPHY: WHO NEEDS IT? 24 (Leonard Peikoff, ed., Bobbs-Merrill,
1982). The fallacy of the package-deal is related to what Ayn Rand designated “anticoncepts.” “An anti-concept is an unnecessary and rationally unusable term designed to
replace or obliterate some legitimate concept. The use of anti-concepts gives the listener
a sense of approximate understanding. But in the real of cognition, nothing is as bad as
the approximate . . . .” Ayn Rand, THE AYN RAND LEXICON 23 (Harry Binswanger, ed.,
Meridian Books, 1988) (quoting Ayn Rand, Credibility and Polarization, in 1 The Ayn
Rand Letter 1 (1971).
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term “Lochnerism” is to undermine judicial review by obliterating the distinction
between it and judicial subjectivism, against which there is properly widespread outrage.
Nevertheless, since the Court has accepted this package-deal as valid criticism,
charges of “Lochnerism” exert substantial force on legal doctrine relating to economic
liberties and property rights. Since all economic regulation “adjust[s] the benefits and
burdens of economic life,”93 taking from some and giving to others, however, the court is
left with the question of when a property owner is entitled to compensation for such
burdens. It is routinely stated that compensation is owed when the regulation “force[s]
some people along to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be
borne by the public as a whole.”94

But the court has had to develop a standard of

determining what is “fair and just” within boundaries marked by Lochner and Nebbia.
The Agins test can be understood as the Court’s means of giving the takings clause more
effect than an application of Nebbia-style deference allows, while attempting to avoid the
charge that it is proscribing the limits of the police power.
II. Substantial Advancement Is More Than A Means/Ends Test
Agins cited Nectow v. City of Cambridge,95 a due process challenge to a zoning
ordinance, in articulating the substantial advancement test.96 At least some arguments
that Agins mistakenly injected due process language into takings law relate to the Nectow
93

Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
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277 U.S. 183 (1928).
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Agins, 447 U.S. at 260 (citing Nectow, 277 U.S. 188)..
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connection.97 This argument is challenged, however, by the fact that Nectow was also
cited in support of the balancing test established by the Penn Central decision.98 In fact,
subsequent cases have stated that Agins is the Court’s “general approach” to regulatory
takings99 and even that the differing language of Agins and Penn Central “cannot . . .
obscure the fact that the inquiry in each case is the same.”100 The purpose of this section
is to take a brief tour of the Supreme Court cases establishing the Agins test in order to
determine what it has come to mean.
A. A Short History of the Substantial Advancement Doctrine
Agins itself states that the zoning ordinance at issue in that case would have
effected a taking if “it [did] not substantially advance legitimate state interests.” Further
language that could be interpreted as restating the same standard creates ambiguity as to
exactly what Justice Powell might have meant. The context is set by the general policy
that a finding of takings liability “is, in essence, a determination that the public at large,
rather than a single owner, must bear the burden of an exercise of state power in the
public interest.”101 On the one hand, the “ad hoc,” essentially unprincipled balancing test

97

See Thomas E. Roberts, Facial Takings Claims Under Agins-Nectow: A
Procedural Loose End, 24 U. Haw. L. Rev. 623, 640 (2002); Jerold S. Kayden, Land-use
Regulations, Rationality, and Judicial Review: The RSVP in the Nollan Invitation (Part
I), 23 Urb. Law. 301, 314-15 (1991).
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Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1024.
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ascribed to Penn Central is implicated by Agins’ statement that the determination
“requires a weighing of public and private interests.”102
The holding, however, also relies on a cause and effect relationship between the
zoning ordinance and the alleged burdens that, but for the ordinance, the community
might bear as a result of Agins’ real estate development: “The specific zoning regulations
at issue are exercises of the city's police power to protect the residents of Tiburon from
the ill effects of urbanization.”103 The City argued that intensive development of housing
on a large parcel previously devoted to open space would have “adverse impacts, such as
air, noise and water pollution, traffic congestion, destruction of scenic beauty, disturbance
of the ecology and environment, hazards related to geology, fire and flood, and other
demonstrated consequences of urban sprawl.”104 Whether the property owner ought to be
burdened with the maintenance of the status quo is a separate question, but the point for
purposes of this Article is that the ordinance at issue in Agins bore a cause and effect
relationship to these alleged state interests: the implementation of the ordinance was
directly related to eliminating the impact feared by the City.
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See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124 (describing past takings cases as “essentially
ad hoc, factual inquiries, [by which] the Court's decisions have identified several factors
that have particular significance. The economic impact of the regulation on the claimant
and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct
investment-backed expectations are, of course, relevant considerations. So, too, is the
character of the governmental action.”) (internal citation omitted).
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The phrase “substantially advances legitimate state interests” was repeated next in
United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes.105 That case considered the scope of the
Army Corp of Engineers’ jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act and concluded that a
particular Corps regulation did not constitute a taking. The Court’s discussion of the
doctrine was limited to noting that land-use regulation could constitute a taking in
“extreme circumstances” and referenced Agins’ second prong requiring the denial of
economically viable use.106 Oddly, after quoting the first prong of Agins, acknowledging
its continued viability and relevance to the case at hand, the Riverside Bayview Court
failed to include any consideration of that element of Agins in its analysis.
The analysis of a building permit exaction in Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission

107

began with the recognition that land use regulation must substantially

advance legitimate state interests to avoid a taking.108 Although Justice Scalia noted that
“cases have not elaborated on the standards for determining what constitutes a ‘legitimate
state interest’ or what type of connection between the regulation and the state interest
satisfies the requirement that the former ‘substantially advances’ the latter,”109 a cause
and effect relationship between the regulation and the interest is part of the required
connection. This aspect of the connection is clear from Justice Scalia’s further analysis,
105

474 U.S. at 126.
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483 U.S. 825.
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Id. at 834.
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Id.
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in which he assents to the premise that “we may sustain the condition at issue here by
finding that it is reasonably related to the . . . . burden that the Nollan’s new house creates
or to which it contributes.”110 In fact, however, the specific condition the Commission
imposed – conveying lateral beach access to the public – was found to be unrelated to the
specific burdens the Commission claimed would be created by enlarging the Nollans’
house: interference with passing motorists’ “visual access” to the beach,111 and the
creation (in conjunction with other proposed building activity) of a “psychological
barrier” between viewers and the sea.112

Because the Nollans’ project in no way

encumbered the public’s lateral access to the beach, there was no cause and effect
relationship between the condition and any public burden actually created by the
enlargement of the home.
Pursuing the cause-and-effect analysis even further, Justice Scalia added, “If the
Nollans were being singled out to bear the burden of California’s attempt to remedy [the
‘psychological barrier’ to public beach access allegedly created by intensive beachfront
development], although they had not contributed to it more than other coastal
landowners, the State’s action, even if otherwise valid, might violate either . . . the
Takings Clause or the Equal Protection Clause.”113 That issue was not necessary to
decide, however, as the case was resolved on other grounds. In addition, Justice Scalia
110

Id. at 838.
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Id. at 836 n. 4 (emphasis added).
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pointedly distinguished the substantial advancement doctrine from traditional due process
analysis: “We have required that the regulation ‘substantially advance’ the ‘legitimate
state interest,” and not merely that “the state ‘could rationally have decided’ that the
measure adopted might achieve the State’s objective.”114
Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictus raised the substantial
advancement doctrine again, citing to both Agins and Penn Central.115 The Court held
that a regulation prohibiting a company from mining certain underground coal was not a
taking. The Court relied on the fact that mining would cause subsidence of land above
the mines and, therefore, the regulation“abate[d] activity akin to a public nuisance.”116
While Justice Stevens attempted a “balancing” analysis,117 the holding appears to truly
rest on the Court’s recognition of the proper bounds of the police power. Although the
private individuals who owned the land above the mining operations contractually
bargained for the risk of subsidence, the Court held that “they erred in taking a risk”118
which was not exclusively theirs to accept. Private bargaining, according to the Keystone
majority, “cannot estop the Commonwealth from exercising its police power to abate
activity akin to a public nuisance.”119
114

Id. at n.3.
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This holding was obviously at odds with the Court’s judgment 75 years earlier, in
which a nearly identical scenario resulted in a taking,120 but which the Keystone Court
now regarded as a “prime example” of valid expansion of the police power to meet
“changed circumstances.”121 Except to reinforce the Court’s view that Agins remained
the general test for takings, in application Keystone did little more than reiterate a truism:
that the state is not liable for a taking when it restricts nuisances or other uses of property
that violate the rights of others.122 The fact that the activity abated in Keystone was not in
fact a nuisance123 indicates the judicial discretion inherent in the substantial advancement
doctrine and relates to Part III of this article.
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Keystone, 480 U.S. at 488. Justice Sutherland’s criticism of the notion that
constitutional rights change with circumstances is worth noting: “[I]t is urged that the
question invovled should now receive fresh consideration, among other reasons, because
of the ‘economic conditions which have supervened’; but the meaning of the Constitution
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applied then–is to rob that instrument of the essential element which continues it in force
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otherwise.” West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 402-03 (1937) (Sutherland, J.,
dissenting).
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This was duly noted by the dissent: “a taking does not occur where the
government exercises its unquestioned authority to prevent a property owner from using
his property to injure others without having to compensate the value of the forbidden
use.” 480 U.S. at 511 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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The court once again reiterated its commitment to the Agins test without applying
it in Yee.124 The case was brought to the Court on a theory that a rent control regulation
constituted a permanent physical occupation of a mobile home park owner’s property,
and was considered under the principles for physical occupation developed in Loretto.125
As has already been mentioned, however, Justice O’Connor’s invocation of the Agins test
in Yee has triggered a number of challenges to similar rent control ordinances under the
substantial advancement standard.126
Lucas127 was a substantive application of the second prong of the Agins test,
wherein a coastal land use regulation not only denied a land owner economically viable
use of his property, but foreclosed any beneficial or productive use of the land. The
connection between the substantial advancement doctrine and nuisance raised in Keystone
was discussed by Justice Scalia, who observed that cases focused on the “harmful and
noxious” use of property were “the progenitor of our more contemporary statements that
‘land-use regulation does not effect a taking if it ‘substantially advance[s] legitimate state
interests.’”128 South Carolina’s regulation prohibited development of coastal lands on the
avowed basis of “protecting life and property.”129 For the Court to simply negate that
124
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judgment would be to impose an independent view of the importance of coastal
preservation, subjecting it to the criticism associated with Lochner.

It is evident,

however, that deference to laws that do not fall within any traditional standard of harm or
nuisance prevention provides little judicial protection against state abridgments of
property rights. Furthermore, the “life and liberty” rationale advanced in Lucas could
reasonably be regarded as mere pretext.

As the Court noted, the dissenting South

Carolina Supreme Court Justices reasoned that “the chief purposes of the legislation,
among them the promotion of tourism and the creation of a ‘habitat for indigenous flora
and fauna,’ could not fairly be compared to nuisance abatement.”130
Nevertheless, since the Court is unwilling to expressly proscribe a limit to the
police power or assert independent judgment as to what constitutes a nuisance (e.g. what
sort of uses of property interfere with the bona fide rights of others), it disavows these
considerations as standards for takings liability. This disavowal removes the necessity for
the Court to formally rule on what is or is not a “harm” and has become a central aspect
of the substantial advancement doctrine. The “distinction between ‘harm-preventing’ and
‘benefit-conferring’ regulation,” according to the Lucas Court, “is often in the eye of the
beholder.”131
When it is understood that “prevention of harmful use” was
merely our early formulation of the police power
130

Id. at 1010 (quoting Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 304 S.C. 376, 396,
404 S.E.2d 896, 906 (1991)).
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justification necessary to sustain (without compensation)
any regulatory diminution in value; and that the distinction
between regulation that “prevents harmful use” and that
which “confers benefits” is difficult, if not impossible, to
discern on an objective, value-free basis; it becomes selfevident that noxious-use logic cannot serve as a touchstone
to

distinguish

regulatory

“takings”--which

require

compensation–from regulatory deprivations that do not
require compensation. A fortiori the legislature's recitation
of a noxious-use justification cannot be the basis for
departing from our categorical rule that total regulatory
takings must be compensated.132
As applied in Lucas, the disavowal favored property rights since it stripped the
declaration of harm by the State of legal significance. Without a coherent standard of
individual rights, however, the disavowal is just as likely to disadvantage property rights.
In Dolan v. City of Tigard,133 the Court built on Nollan.

“We must first

determine whether the ‘essential nexus’ exists between the ‘legitimate state interest’ and
the permit condition exacted by the city,”134 wrote Chief Justice Rehnquist. If such a
nexus is found, the Court “must then decide the required degree of connection between
132
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the exactions and the projected impact of the proposed development.”135 For the first
time, however, Dolan made explicit the type of government interests that must be
substantially advanced to comply with Agins. Reflecting on Nollan, the Court noted the
tenuous relationship in that case between the preservation of ocean visibility and the
California Coastal Commission’s requirement of a lateral easement across the Nollan’s
property. “How enhancing the public’s ability to ‘traverse to and along the shorefront’
served the same governmental purpose of ‘visual access to the ocean’ from the roadway
was beyond [the Court’s] ability to countenance.”136 Dolan further emphasizes the
causal nature of the Agins test. The Court’s role is to review the regulation to determine
whether “the required dedication is related both in nature and extent to the impact of the
proposed development.”137
Justice Scalia reaffirmed this understanding of the substantial advancement
doctrine in his concurring and dissenting opinion in Pennell v. City of San Jose.138
There, he stated that to avoid takings liability, property regulations must have “a causeand-effect relationship between the property use restricted by the regulation and the
social evil that the regulation seeks to remedy.”139 Where no cause and effect relationship
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Id. at 391.
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485 U.S. 1.
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exists, there is no governmental interest “legitimately furthered by regulating the use of
property.”140
City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes141 again reaffirmed the substantial
advancement doctrine, but did not apply it directly.

Rather, the Court considered

the propriety of jury instructions including the first prong of Agins in a case to
determine takings liability for repeatedly withholding a building permit. Justice Kennedy
cited seven cases invoking the substantial advancement standard and noted that “concerns
for proportionality animate the Takings Clause,”142 concluding that the jury instruction
was “consistent with our previous general discussions of regulatory takings liability.”143
Finally, in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency,144 the Court decided that a temporary development moratoria did not constitute a
categorical taking under Lucas. The Court acknowledged the “District Court’s finding
that the [agency’s] actions represented a proportional response to a serious risk of harm
to [Lake Tahoe],” without which “petitioners might have argued that the moratoria
did not substantially advance a legitimate state interest.”145 This statement explains why
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the substantial advancement test had no role in Tahoe-Sierra, although its mention
reaffirms the test’s continued viability.
B. Cause and Effect As a Solution To the Problems ofLochner
and Extreme Deference To Legislation
To the extent the Ninth Circuit applies the Agins standard merely to scrutinize the
efficacy of property regulation in achieving any State interest, it fails to address the core,
cause and effect nature of the test. Simple means/ends scrutiny is not evident in the cases
that have established the substantial advancement standard and would clash with postNebbia notions of judicial restraint. It has been recognized by some commentators that
what appears to be in some cases a means/ends analysis is in fact a cause and effect
model for reviewing legislation that impinges on the right to use or exclude others from
using certain types property.146

Professor Molly McUsic comments: “Its animating

principle is that no value can be taken from the owner and given to the public; the public
is only permitted to recoup what the owners themselves take by imposing harm.”147
That principle is consistent with the foregoing review of the cases. If the Court
applied this principle consistently, however, it would have an equivalent effect on
property–and perhaps all economic regulation–as Lochner’s forbidden due process
analysis. The principle has not been applied consistently, however, as is clear from the
many cases in which opposite results would have been found were it operative. As I
describe below, the Court employs various limiting principles as barriers against taking
146
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the principle so far as to be, as its critics accuse, a return to abandoned standards of
judicial review in property rights cases. In Nollan the Court stated that a “permit
condition that serves the same legitimate police-power purpose as a refusal to issue the
permit should not be found to be a taking if the refusal to issue the permit would not
constitute a taking.”148
“Unless the permit condition serves the same governmental purpose as the
development ban,” however, “the building restriction is not a valid regulation of land use
but ‘an out-and-out plan of extortion.’”149 The latter is a case in which the “evident
constitutional propriety disappears” because “the condition substituted for the prohibition
utterly fails to further the end advanced as the justification for the prohibition.”150 Two
points are notable from that statement.
First, it appears that a regulation conditioning the development of the Nollans’
property would have been legitimate only to the extent that it served the same ends as the
prohibition. Second, said prohibition would be a taking if it was not a proper exercise of
the police power. This is clearly a cause and effect, rather than a mean/ends concern.
One can also conclude from Nollan that the review for whether regulations substantially
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(1981)).
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advance legitimate governmental interests includes an assumption that only regulations
that implement relatively traditional police powers are legitimate.151
The dissents in Nollan show that not only is a cause and effect understanding of
the Agins test logical, it is in fact the meaning the Court intended. Justice Blackmun
described the Court’s interpretation of the takings clause as requiring a “necessary
correlation between a burden created by development and a condition imposed pursuant
to the State’s police power to mitigate that burden.”152 Justice Brennan likewise objects
to the “Court’s unusual demand for a precise match between the condition imposed
[by the Coastal Commission in exchange for a building permit] and the specific
type of burden on [public beach] access created by the”153 development.

He

contrasts this approach to the general policy of judicial deference to legislative
determinations in economic liberty cases, citing a line of cases descending directly from

151

The phrase the “police power” is nebulous and the source of much trouble in
takings jurisprudence due to the Court’s unwillingness to establish any firm definition.
As is discussed in part III, however, despite the Court’s disavowal it must import some
elements of a physical invasion test for nuisance: uses of property which physically
invade, or destroy the quiet use and enjoyment in an equivalent manner, cannot be
protected.
152

Nollan, 483 U.S. 825, 865 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

153

Id. at 842.
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the policies announced in Nebbia.154 As Justice Blackmun describes it, the substantial
advancement doctrine applied in Nollan is an “eye for an eye mentality.”155
This point is made again by Justice Scalia’s concurrence and dissent in Pennell.
Appellants in that case argued that a rent control ordinance “that provid[ed] financial
assistance [in the form of reduced rent] to impecunious renters is not a state interest that
can be legitimately furthered by regulating the use of property.”156

This type of

regulation is distinguished from zoning restrictions, asserts Justice Scalia, because when
such regulations do not eliminate the economic use of property, “there is a cause-andeffect relationship between the property use restricted by the regulation and the social evil
that the regulation seeks to remedy.”157 The relationship described here is not merely
154

In support of the appeal for more judicial deference, Justice Brennan cites
Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 466 (1981) (noting “this Court’s
review of the rationality of a State’s exercise of its police power demands only that the
State ‘could rationally have decided’ that the measure might achieve the State’s
objective”); Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487 (1955) (“It
is enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the
particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it.”); Day-Bright Lighting,
Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952) (“[S]tate legislatures have new techniques;
they are entitled to their own standard of the public welfare.”); United States v. Carolene
Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 154 (noting “that the exercise of police power will be upheld
‘if any state of facts either known or which could reasonably assumed affords support for
it.”).
155

This understanding of Nollan is affirmed and repeated by Justice Scalia in his
dissent from denial of cert. in Lambert v. City and County of San Francisco, 529 U.S.
1045, 45 (2000) (citing Nollan and Dolan for the proposition that “a burden imposed as a
condition of permit approval must be related to the public harm that would justify
denying the permit, and must be roughly proportional to what is needed to eliminate that
harm.).
156

Pennell, 485 U.S. at 18 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

157

Id. at 20.
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means/ends, or the relationship between a regulation and its goal.

Rather, it is the

relationship between the property’s use and the goal of the regulation. “Since the owner’s
use of the property is (or, but for the regulation would be) the source of the social
problem, it cannot be said that he has been singled out unfairly.”158 It follows that since a
renter’s poverty is “no more caused or exploited by landlords”159 than anyone else, it is
unfair to force them to accept lesser rent for their housing in order to aid them. This idea
is in accord with Professor McUsic’s statement that “the public is only permitted to
recoup what the owners themselves take by imposing harm.”160
In contrast to means/ends analysis, a cause and effect analysis is more appropriate
for the takings clause. Whereas legislation judged outside the bounds of legislative
authority was struck under Lochner,161 the substantial advancement inquiry leaves the
legislation in place but requires compensation when the legislation burdens individuals
with costs properly borne by the public as a whole.

158

Id.

159

Id. at 21.

160

McUsic, supra note 13, at 645.

161

One might get the impression from the rhetoric surrounding Lochner that the
Court’s scrutiny of economic legislation brought the federal government to a halt. In fact,
commentators most opposed to Lochner number the statutes struck down on substantive
due process grounds at something less than 5 per year from the 1890s to the 1930s,
whereas more careful analysis shows that “only by greatly stretching the definition of
substantive due process does the figure reach 160. Under a more restricted conception of
the term, the Supreme Court invalidated slightly over fifty laws on substantive due
process grounds during the Lochner era.” See Michael J. Phillips, How Many Times Was
Lochner-Era Substantive Due Process Effective?, Mercer L. Rev. 1049 (1997).
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A literal cause and effect requirement, however, would place limits on legislative
action similar to those imposed by strict means/ends analysis, inviting the same criticisms
as Lochner. In practice, if compensation is required to the degree that a close causal
nexus is lacking, the cost would be so high as to discourage many currently accepted
types of regulation. The very nature of the regulatory state is to “adjust the benefits and
burdens of economic life”162 and, according to the Court, “[g]overnment hardly could go
on if to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying
for every such change in the general law.”163 The Court therefore employs various
limiting principles and one ambiguity to restrain the “eye for an eye” principle from
becoming a general standard of review of economic regulation.
First, the Court limits the application of the regulatory takings doctrine to cases in
which it finds regulations that affect “specific and identified”164 property rights deemed,
for various reasons, worthy or protection.165

162

Once the prerequisite property interest is

Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.

163

Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413, 43 S.Ct. 158, 159, 67 L.Ed.
322 (1922).
164

Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 541 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring
and dissenting in part).
165

Id. (citing categories of property interests protected by the takings clause in prior
cases: air rights for high-rise buildings, Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124; zoning on parcels
of real property, e.g., MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340
(1986); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980); trade secrets, Ruckelshaus v.
Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984); right of access to property, e.g., PruneYard
Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); Kaiser Aetna; right to affix on structures,
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982); right to transfer
property by devise or intestacy, e.g., Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987); creation of an
easement, Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Nollan v. California Coastal
(continued…)
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established, the general framework for a substantial advancement inquiry begins with the
presumption of constitutionality. In short, regulation does not effect a taking unless it
fails to evince a cause and effect relationship between the regulation and some “social
evil” stemming from the use of that property. Within the context of a valid cause and
effect relationship, a means/ends inquiry is applied to ensure that there is a close fit: an
“essential nexus,” or a “rough proportionality” between the burdens of the governmental
restriction and the property’s contribution to the “social evil.”166 Where no such fit
exists, or no cause and effect relationship can be established, the regulation is susceptible
to takings liability.
This framework limits the “eye for an eye” principle to a small class of property
interests that do not significantly conflict with the precedent established since Nebbia and
exempts from takings scrutiny the vast majority of economic regulations.167 Further

Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); right to build or improve, Lucas; liens on real property,
Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960); right to mine coal, Keystone Bituminous
Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987); right to sell personal property, Andrus
v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979); and the right to extract mineral deposits, Goldblatt v.
Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S.
155 (1958).
166

If one disregards the cause and effect context of the substantial advancement
inquiry, one may misconstrue cases with a means/ends component, such as Nollan and
Dolan, as intruding into Due Process territory.
167

Professor McUsic’s thesis concerning the class of property interests protected is
compelling: in essence, land use and environmental regulations are the subject of the
Court’s heightened takings scrutiny because they were not “previously adjudicated and
whose form can be distinguished from the laws” invalidated under the standards of
Nebbia and its progeny. As a consequence, the Agins test is highly unlikely to migrate to
broader economic regulation related to the concerns of the New Deal, such as wage and
hour laws. See McUsic, supra note 22, at 595.
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removed from this category are regulations abating nuisances, activities judged
sufficiently akin to nuisances, or rights for which the Court can allegedly find no clear
tradition. It was a breach of these principles that most concerned Justice Kennedy in
Eastern Enterprises, causing him to make the observation that “[a]fter the decision in
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, we confronted cases where specific and identified
properties or property rights were alleged to come within the regulatory takings
prohibition.”168
A test founded on the relationship between regulation and the mitigation of social
costs, however, allows the Court to scrutinize the form of regulation rather its ends. It is
able, thereby, to claim to meet the Constitutional demands of “fairness and justice” by
protecting individuals from being singled out to disproportionately bear public burdens,
while escaping criticism that it is overriding the will of the legislature.
With the cause-and-effect framework in mind, it is worth returning to the three
recent Ninth Circuit rent control cases that apply the substantial advancement doctrine.
The fact that the doctrine can include a means/ends component in any particular case
makes it easy to misapply, as the Ninth Circuit may have done in the Chevron case,
inviting charges that the judiciary is “scrutin[izing] the reasonableness or efficacy of
legislation.”169 To the extent that the Court finds it prudent to preserve protections for
property rights that have been secured in recent years by the Agins test, it is likely to
168

Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. at 541.

169

Lingle v. Chevron, 2004 WL 1745842 (Petition for Writ of Certiorari, filed, July
30, 2004).
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maintain the distinction between Agins and Lochner.

Distinguishing Chevron from

Richardson and Cashman is one way to do so.
C. The Ninth Circuit Applied the Substantial Advancement Test Differently
in Lingle Than It Did in Richardson and Cashman
On their face the three Ninth Circuit cases bear an easy similarity. Hawaii’s
Ordinance 91-95 was held to be a taking in Richardson because condominium owners
can “captur[e] the net present value of the reduced land rent in the form of a premium,
mean[ing] that the Ordinance will not substantially further its goal of creating affordable
owner-occupied housing in Honolulu.”170 In Cashman, Cotati’s Ordinance 680 was
held unconstitutional because it allows the mobile home owner to capture the benefit
of the regulation as a premium upon sale of the coach, “which undermines the City’s
interest in creating or maintaining affordable housing.”171 In Chevron, “the reduced rent
mandated by [Act 257] will not flow to consumers in the form of reduced retail prices but
instead will allow lesee-dealers to capture a premium on their leaseholds.”172
But what does this mean, in terms of a proper application of the substantial
advancement standard as a cause-effect test? The “social evil” attributed to the use of the
landowners’ property in Richardson and Cashman was an inadequate supply of
affordable housing.173 Whether those who supply housing services like the plaintiffs in

170

Richardson, 124 F.3d at 1156.

171

Cashman, 374 F.3d 887.

172

Chevron v. Lingle, 363 F.3d 846 (2004).

173

See Richardson,124 F.3d at 1154; Cashman, 374 F.3d 890. To be sure, the City
of Cotati sought to obfuscate this point by citing seven specific “purposes” of its rent
(continued…)
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these cases meaningfully can be said to be the cause of this problem seems at least as
dubious as that the landlords in Pennell were the cause of their tenants’ poverty,174 but the
Ninth Circuit followed the Supreme Court’s lead in not second-guessing the legislative
assumption of causation. What was obvious on the face of both the Richardson and
Cashman ordinances, however, was that the regulatory schemes that were imposed in
these cases would not – indeed, could not – enhance the affordability of housing in those
communities. As Professor Hirsch and his colleagues have demonstrated, the economic
benefits of regulations of this type will simply be capitalized and captured by the initial
tenants, leaving all subsequent tenants, and society as a whole in exactly the same
position with respect to the cost of housing, as if rent control did not exist.175 It therefore
required no great intrusion into the legislative process to recognize that these measures
would not mitigate any “social evils” created by the plaintiffs, and both cases were easily
resolved on summary judgment.176
The situation in Chevron was quite different. The problem the Hawaii legislature
sought to address was high gasoline prices.

Whether the refiners of gasoline can

control measure, but the underlying rationale for the measure, like all residential rent
control laws, was to lower the price of housing. Id. at 891; see also Birkenfeld v. City of
Berkeley, 550 P.2d 1001 (Cal. 1976).
174

Pennell, 485 U.S. 1, 21-23 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

175

See Hirsch & Hirsch, supra note 55, at 447-48.

176

Richardson,124 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 1997);Cashman, 374 F.3d 887 (9th Cir.

2004).
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reasonably be held to blame for high retail prices is certainly debatable,177 but the causal
relationship is no doubt closer than that between mobile home parks and a shortage of
affordable housing. Once again deferring to the legislative determination of causation,
however, it is a much closer question whether regulations governing commercial lease
agreements between producers and dealers could plausibly be expected to relieve pressure
on consumer prices. The district court in Chevron v. Cayetano was convinced they could
not, and granted summary judgment by analogy to Richardson.178 The Ninth Circuit set
aside this determination, remanding for a factual inquiry into whether dealers would be
able to capitalize the value of commercial rent control into the price of their franchises.179
The district court apparently interpreted this as a mandate to hear expert testimony on the
likely effect of the law on retail prices – in other words, conducting a highly intrusive
means-ends evaluation of whether the regulations would be likely to achieve their stated
objective.180 It is this aspect of Lingle that has drawn the most heated criticism as a
return to “Lochnerism;”181 yet ironically, this application of the substantial advancement

177

According to the United States Department of Energy, the retail price of gasoline
attributable to refining is no more than 15% in recent years.
See
http://www.eia.doe.gov/neic/brochure/oil_gas/primer/primer.htm (last visited March 31,
2005). This statistic is consistent with California Energy Commission investigations into
gasoline price increases in 2003. See http://www.energy.ca.gov/2003_price_spikes/ (last
visited March 31, 2005).
178

See Chevron v. Cayetano, 57 F. Supp. at 1010.

179

See Chevron, 223 F.3d at 1042.

180

See Chevron, 198 F. Supp. at 1182.

181

See, e.g., Lingle, Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, 2004 WL 174582 (filed July 30,
2004) (stating that the substantial advancement doctrine is “a pretext for [the Ninth
(continued…)
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standard seems to depart dramatically from the Ninth Circuit’s use of the same test in
Richardson and Cashman, and from the Supreme Court’s apparent intention in
formulating the standard.
Separating the means-ends application of substantial advancement in Lingle from
the untroubled cause-effect application in Richardson and Cashman, one nevertheless
confronts the fact that both frustrate the will of legislatures.
III. Tension Between the Constitution and the Regulatory State
The Supreme Court’s development of the substantial advancement doctrine has
followed a pattern aimed at raising the level of judicial protection for property rights,
while attempting to avoid the appearance that it imposes mere policy choices; that it acts
as a “super legislature” overriding the will of the legislature when it goes “too far.” In
truth, however, the substantial advancement doctrine cannot completely divorce the Court
from the evaluation of regulatory ends most often associated with means/ends review. In
part, this is because the concept of judicial restraint endorsed by the Court since Nebbia
embraces a false dichotomy: Constitutional adjudication is not a struggle between judicial
and legislative will, but the subordination of legislative will to Constitutional principle.182

Circuit’s] improper judicial invalidation of state legislation based on an intrusive standard
of review of economic legislation not seen since the days of Lochner . . . .”); Lingle, Brief
of the States of New York, et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, 2004 WL
2803196 (filed Dec. 03, 2004) (stating that the Ninth Circuit’s decision “threatens a wide
array of public protections, by means of the type of intrusive judicial review epitomized
by Lochner and long ago discredited.”).
182

See, e.g., James W. Ely, Jr., Thomas Cooley, “Public Use,” and New Directions
in Takings Jurisprudence, 2004 Mich. St. L. Rev. 845, 856 (the notion that “property is
held at the sufferance of the legislature [is] . . . at odds with the place of private
(continued…)
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A broader argument concerning the nature and scope of judicial review is beyond this
paper, but to the extent that the Court holds “value-free” adjudication as an ideal it fails to
discharge its obligation to protect the values embodied by the Constitution’s text.
Further, it confuses the idea of judicial review with judicial subjectivism, mistaking the
rule of law for the idea of “judicial will,” which undermines the moral and legal
legitimacy of the former. The argument of this section is more narrow: to explain why
the substantial advancement doctrine, albeit changing the form of takings analysis, cannot
eliminate the necessity of evaluating the Constitutional propriety of regulatory ends.
In every application of a cause/effect standard, a court must necessarily determine
that the unregulated use of property caused or would cause what Justice Scalia termed the
“social evil” justifying the regulation. But as has previously been suggested, what counts
as a cause of any particular social phenomenon is rife with opportunity for judicial (as
well as legislative) discretion.183 More importantly, however, one cannot begin to answer
the question of whether a regulation substantially advances legitimate governmental
interests unless one has some gauge for determining what governmental interests are
legitimate. The substantial advancement doctrine proceeds on the premise that courts
can identify such interests without judicial proscription of the limits of the police
power.

It does so by focusing on the form of regulation rather than its objective:

ownership in the American constitutional system”) (citing Thomas M. Cooley, A
TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE
POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 531 (1868)).
183

See supra, text at notes 172, 175.
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specifically, whether the regulation bears a reasonable nexus to the unregulated activities’
contribution to an alleged social evil.
But such an inquiry does not achieve the objective of “value-free” adjudication,
because it merely masks implicit limits on the police power with hidden assumptions.
Unless the Court makes an independent judgment about which “social evils” are worthy
of remedying, the Takings Clause fails to provide meaningful protection for a wide
variety of property rights. The identification of specific “social evils” and “causes” are
means by which the Court’s implied limits of the police power are enforced.
To begin an inquiry into the substantial advancement of legitimate governmental
interests, a court must first identify the phenomenon perceived as problematic by the
legislature. In Keystone, for instance, it was the likelihood of subsidence;184 in Dolan, it
was traffic congestion or the potential for flooding due to more intensive land use;185 in
Nollan, it was the alleged loss of visual access to beaches;186 in Lucas, it was the alleged
184

See Keystone, 480 U.S. at 474 (describing damage caused by mining “to
foundations, walls, other structural members, and the integrity of houses and buildings.
Subsidence frequently causes sinkholes or troughs in land which make the land difficult
or impossible to develop. Its effect on farming has been well documented--many subsided
areas cannot be plowed or properly prepared. Subsidence can also cause the loss of
groundwater and surface ponds. In short, it presents the type of environmental concern
that has been the focus of so much federal, state, and local regulation in recent decades.”).
185

See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 377 (noting Oregon’s conditioning “the approval of
[Dolan’s] building permit on the dedication of a portion of her property for flood control
and traffic improvements.”).
186

See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 828-29 (noting the California Coastal Commission’s
finding that “the new house would increase blockage of the view of the ocean, thus
contributing to the development of a wall of residential structures that would prevent the
public psychologically ... from realizing a stretch of coastline exists nearby that they have
every right to visit.”).
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degradation of the “coastal zone”due to the development of coastal lands that serve, inter
alia, as barriers against the tide;187 in Richardson it was the high concentration of
ownership of condominiums, or else increases in lease prices in excess of inflation;188 in
Lingle, it is the fact that gas prices on Hawaii exceed prices found on the mainland.189 As
the first step in applying the substantial advancement inquiry, it is necessary to
distinguish which of these effects may rightfully be mitigated by imposing regulatory
restrictions on the use of property, and which may not. The Court has offered no
particular standard on this point, stating variously that it requires a “careful examination
and weighing of all the relevant circumstances”;190 that “[o]ur cases have not elaborated
on the standards for what constitutes a ‘legitimate state interest,’ but they have made clear
. . . that a broad range of governmental purposes and regulations satisfy these
requirements”;191 that “we have eschewed any set formula for determining when justice
and fairness require that economic injuries caused by public action be compensated”;192

187

Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1010 (citing the “‘uncontested ... findings’ of the South
Carolina Legislature that new construction in the coastal zone--such as petitioner
intended--threatened this public resource.”).
188

See Richardson, 124 F.3d at 1154 (describing the object of the regulation to
“break up this pattern of land ownership and control the escalating prices of housing.”).
189

See Lingle, Brief for Petitioners, WL 103793 (filed January 14, 2005) (stating that
the “purpose of the act is to combat the effects of alleged concentration in the Hawaii
market for gasoline, which the Legislature said was resulting in higher gasoline prices and
hurting consumers and the public.”).
190

Palazzolo, 553 U.S. at 636 (O’Connor, J., concurring).

191

Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834-35.

192

Penn Central at 124.
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and warning against any standard that “would transform government regulation into a
luxury few governments could afford.”193
There must, however, be some operative theory of individual rights against which
the Court measures the use of property and its impact on third parties. The Court must
have a clear concept of what constitutes a “social evil.” Without such a distinction, the
substantial advancement inquiry relies entirely on the Court’s finding that a particular use
of property is responsible for its sub silentio definition of harm. Were the Court to apply
Nebbia-style deference to all legislative declarations of harm, any social phenomenon
perceived as problematic could simply be declared a nuisance, and regulatory measures
ostensibly aimed at its abatement could thereby avoiding takings liability altogether. As
Justice Scalia pointed out in Lucas:
When it is understood that “prevention of harmful use” was
merely our early formulation of the police power
justification necessary to sustain (without compensation)
any regulatory diminution in value; and that the distinction
between regulation that "prevents harmful use" and that
which "confers benefits" is difficult, if not impossible, to
discern on an objective, value-free basis; it becomes selfevident that noxious-use logic cannot serve as a touchstone
to

distinguish

regulatory

193

"takings"--which

require

Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302,
323 (2002).
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compensation–from regulatory deprivations that do not
require compensation . . . . [T]he legislature’s recitation of
a noxious-use justification cannot be the basis for departing
from our categorical rule that total regulatory takings must
be compensated.

If it were, departure would virtually

always be allowed.194

At least with respect to regulations that deprive property of all economically
viable use, therefore, Lucas demands that any nuisance-like limitation on property rights
cited as justification “cannot be newly legislated or decreed (without compensation), but
must inhere in the title itself, in the restrictions that background principles of the State’s
law of property and nuisance already place upon land ownership.”195 Such a standard is
“value-free” according to the Court because it draws on the “the historical compact
recorded in the Takings Clause that has become part of our constitutional culture”196
regarding land use. This standard, however, does not apply to other forms of property or
regulations that do not destroy all economically viable use since “the property owner
necessarily expects the uses of his property to be restricted, from time to time, by various
measures newly enacted by the State in legitimate exercise of its police powers.”197
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Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1026.

195

Id. at 1027.

196

Id. at 1028.

197

Id. at 1027-28.
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But this last condition comes full circle by begging the question of what are
legitimate exercises of the state’s police powers. It leaves to the discretion of the Court
the standard for determining which “social ills” may be mitigated by uncompensated
regulation in cases involving less than a total deprivation of all economiclly viable use of
property.

As a result, one can easily identify disagreements as to what constitutes the

legitimate mitigation of such a “social evil” among the Members of the Court. For
example, classifying the abatement of subsidence as an objective sufficeintly “legitimate”
to justify uncompensated resrictions on property rights, so obvious to Justice Stevens in
Keystone, apparently came as a surprise to Chief Justice Rehnquist:
The ease with which the Court moves from the recognition
of public interests to the assertion that the activity here
regulated is “akin to a public nuisance” suggests an
exception far wider than recognized in our previous cases. .
. . A broad exception to the operation of the Just
Compensation Clause based on the exercise of multifaceted
health, welfare, and safety regulations would surely allow
government much greater authority than we have
recognized to impose societal burdens on individual
landowners, for nearly every action the government takes is
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intended to secure for the public an extra measure of
“health, safety, and welfare.”198

Likewise, Justice Stevens found it “unfortunate” that the 1972 ordinance aimed at
maintaining the clarity of the water at Lake Tahoe “allowed numerous exceptions and did
not significantly limit the construction of new residential housing.”199

Despite the

Court’s commitment to “value-free” adjudication, Justice Stevens here stakes out a
personal preference for regulating the algae content in Lake Tahoe through
comprehensive restrictions on housing development. The Court enforces that preference
without reference to a standard of harm. It merely assumes that maintaining the clarity of
the lake’s water is a sufficiently legitimate police power function to justify the effective
extinguishment, without compensation, of the right to build a home on one’s land.
Similar fundamental value judgments are expressed by way of conclusory assertion in
Nollan, Dolan, and Richardson as well.200
198

Keystone, 480U.S. at 512-13 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

199

Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 309.

200

See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 835 ( “assum[ing], without deciding,” that among the
legitimate governmental interests is “protect[ion] of the public’s ability to see the beach,
assisting the public in overcoming the ‘psychological barrier’ to using the beach created
by a developed shorefront, and preventing congestion on the public beaches.” In which
case, “the Commission unquestionably would be able to deny the Nollans their permit
outright if their new house (alone, or by reason of the cumulative impact produced in
conjunction with other construction) would substantially impede these purposes . . .”);
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (stating “[u]ndoubtedly, the prevention of flooding
along Fanno Creek and the reduction of traffic congestion in the Central Business District
qualify as the type of legitimate public purposes we have upheld”); Richardson v. City
and County of Honolulu, 124 F.3d at 1163 (finding legitimate “the City’s interest in
maintaining affordable owner-occupied residential housing).
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The point of these examples is to illustrate that the cause and effect test embodied
by Agins cannot save the Court from the need to make independent judgments about the
nature and scope of “legitimate” governmental objectives; it only moves the evaluation of
legislative ends to a deeper, and usually implicit, level. To the extent that the Court
accepts a particular interest as falling within the sphere of “legitimacy,” and views the
unregulated use of property as in some sense the “cause” of the problem being addressed,
compensation may be avoided in the advancement of that interest.201 No change in the
form of the takings analysis can substitute for the Court’s obligation to promulgate a
standard for determining when the rights of third parties have been violated by the use of
property and, therefore, when the state may properly restrict such uses without paying
compensation.

Where the substantial advancement doctrine has heightened the

constitutional protection of property rights, it is only to the extent that it has imported
elements of such a standard from the common law.
The substantial advancement doctrine has been one means by which the Court has
faced this fact: it removes limited aspects and applications of the right to property from
the framework of rational basis scrutiny by close examination of the form of confiscatory
regulation. As has been demonstrated, however, the formal analysis is effective largely
because it relies on ambiguity to apply underlying norms about the nature and scope of
property rights.
201

Always assuming, of course, that Agins’ second prong is satisfied.
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Addressing the tension between the Constitution and the regulatory state,
however, is not a “return to Lochner” but a logical necessity of the judicial power. No
takings standard will eliminate the need of the Court to evaluate the constitutional
propriety of regulatory ends. Constitutional adjudication can never be wholly “value
free” because the Constitution’s function is the maintenance and protection of definite
values, foremost among which is the right to property.
CONCLUSION
From the foregoing, three major conclusions can be drawn. First, the substantial
advancement doctrine has often been misconstrued as a simple means/ends inquiry. That
conception of Agins is inconsistent with the entire thrust of modern judicial review and,
as such, is frequently criticized as an imprudent “return to Lochner.” It is therefore
regrettable that Lingle v. Chevron, the vehicle the Supreme Court has chosen to review
the substantial advancement standard, is an apparent example of means/ends scrutiny of
economic legislation, which may be open to that charge.
A careful review of cases invoking the substantial advancement test, however,
shows that, properly understood, it does not merely scrutinize legislation to determine
whether an appropriate means/ends relationship is present.

Rather, Agins primarily

advances a cause and effect test. When the Court asks whether a regulation substantially
advances legitimate government interests, certain assumptions are built into those terms.
Only those interests concerning the mitigation of “social ills” caused by the unregulated
use of property are deemed legitimate for these purposes. The test has been described as
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applying an “eye for an eye mentality”202 because its function is to ensure that the state
exacts from property owners only that which can reasonably be construed as the
equivalent of social costs imposed (or exploited) by their use of property. Such a test
meets twin goals: 1) it protects certain classes of property from the trap of extreme
judicial deference created by the Court’s longstanding due process standards of review
and 2) it gives cover to the Court against charges that, by such exemptions, it is merely
overriding legislatively determined social policy.
Finally, an analysis of the test illustrates that there is an inherent contradiction
among these goals, which is not fully resolved by a change in the form of the takings
inquiry. While it is proper for judges to be objective and to set their personal values aside
when evaluating legislation, there is no way to avoid the fact that there are constitutional
values at odds with several generations of regulatory restrictions on property.
The criticisms of Agins, one may conclude, are not entirely specious. Although
the Agins test is by no means a return to Lochner, it does confront many of the questions
concerning the limits of the police power that have been abdicated by the judiciary since
Nebbia. Until this issue is brought to center stage by the Court, takings doctrine will
remain a swamp of unstated assumptions relying on doctrinal ambiguities to protect
constitutional rights.
#

202

#

#

See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 865 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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